Reality
Aqua Defense Technologies
Army late with orders for armored Humvees
The following statement regarding this story was released May 5, 2005, by USA TODAY Editor
Kenneth Paulson: "An article written by USA TODAY staff writer Tom Squitieri and published
on March 28, 2005, included quotes taken from The Indianapolis Star that were not attributed to
the newspaper. Statements made by Sen. Evan Bayh, D-Ind., and Brian Hart, of Bedford, Mass.,
first appeared in a May 7, 2004, article on armored Humvees by Ted Evanoff of The
Indianapolis Star. USA TODAY and The Indianapolis Star are both Gannett newspapers.
Squitieri's actions violated USA TODAY's standards on sources and attribution. USA TODAY
apologizes to its readers. Squitieri has apologized and resigned."
A Marine stands in front of an armored Humvee hit by a roadside bomb in Ramadi, Iraq, in
November.
By Patrick Baz, AFP
By Tom Squitieri, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON — In June 2003, the U.S. Army realized that it didn't have enough armored
Humvees in Iraq to protect soldiers from a growing number of attacks by insurgents. By Friday,
officials expect to correct that problem by having almost 22,000 armored Humvees in Iraq — up
from 235 when the war began.
Why did it take the government almost two years to remedy a deficiency that the Army
acknowledges was costing soldiers' lives?
An examination of Army records, correspondence with members of Congress and Pentagon
documents shows that the military repeatedly underestimated the need for more armored
Humvees. Even after recognizing its miscalculations, the Army was slow to order more armored
Humvees, and then transported them to Iraq from its existing worldwide supply in fits and
starts. Officials also failed to take full advantage of a defense contracting firm that says it could
have increased production to meet the Army's needs.
The Defense Department had assumed that armored Humvees wouldn't be needed once the
invasion of Iraq was over. Original plans called for the Pentagon to pull back most tanks and
other armored vehicles to reduce the U.S. military profile as soon as Baghdad fell, because
strategists had projected that Iraq would quickly become peaceful. But violent attacks by
insurgents, never anticipated by the Pentagon, meant that troops traveling in unarmored Humvees
faced grave risks. (Related story: Electronic ears on alert for enemy gunshots)
The Pentagon says it does not keep figures on how many soldiers have died or suffered serious
wounds in unarmored Humvees. But at least 275 troops were killed in Humvees in 2003 and
2004 — one of every four American troops killed by hostile action during that period —
according to news accounts, Pentagon records and figures compiled by the staff of the members
of the House and Senate Armed Services committees.
It could not be determined whether those troops were in unarmored or armored Humvees, boxy-
looking trucks that replaced the Jeep as the military's all-purpose utility vehicle. Armored
Humvees, however, are reinforced to protect against the roadside bombs, rocket-propelled
grenades and automatic weapons used by insurgents. In the summer of 2003, most Humvees had
little armor, which made them much more vulnerable to attacks than the heavier Bradley Fighting
Vehicles and Abrams tanks.
The Pentagon "thought we would be pelted with rose petals and not RPGs (rocket-propelled
grenades)," says Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Calif., a member of the House Armed Services
Committee. "I don't blame them for getting it wrong. I blame them for not understanding and
adjusting fast enough, and the result is there has been a tremendous casualty list."
Better chance of survival
Armoring a Humvee is no guarantee of invincibility.
Insurgent bombs have destroyed heavily armored Humvees and even crippled 60-ton tanks. But
military personnel — from troops in the field to Gen. Richard Myers, the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff — say that soldiers have a better chance of surviving attacks in an armored vehicle.
Critics say the Pentagon was not quick enough to see the need, and then reacted too slowly.
"There was a reluctance on the part of the Pentagon to take it seriously and get as many of these
vehicles as quickly as possible," Rep. Ted Strickland, D-Ohio, says. "It was almost as if they
were in a defensive posture, that to make any changes or to acknowledge any shortcomings
would somehow be an acknowledgment that the planning had not been perfect."
In April 2004, Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee,
criticized the Army's efforts to get more armored vehicles or armor kits to Iraq, telling Army
officials they were afflicted by a "case of the slows."
Brig. Gen. Jeffrey Sorenson, the Army's deputy for acquisition and systems management,
disputes that charge. "To say that the Army has been unresponsive and been slow to respond is
an inaccurate statement," Sorenson says. "Everybody can be the Monday morning quarterback.
... We did not think there was a major insurgency. Commanders in the theater were not asking for
the vehicles. Who is to blame? I have no idea."
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has suggested the lack of armored Humvees was simply
beyond the Pentagon's control.
When Tennessee Army National Guard Spc. Thomas Wilson asked during a public session with
Rumsfeld in Kuwait last December why the Army didn't have enough reinforced Humvees,
Rumsfeld replied, "You go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might
want or wish to have at a later time."
By the time Rumsfeld said that, the Army had been working for almost a year and a half to
gradually increase the number of armored Humvees in Iraq. But Rumsfeld's encounter with
Wilson appears to have spurred the Pentagon: Two days later, on Dec. 10, the Army asked the
sole company producing factory-armored Humvees to boost its production by more than 20%.
Rumsfeld declined to comment for this story.
An unexpected weapon
The insurgents' weapon of choice for attacking Humvees is the IED, or "improvised explosive
device," a homemade bomb cobbled from whatever explosives are on hand — frequently, large
artillery shells. The Army acknowledges that the power and proliferation of the bombs came as a
surprise. "The extent and the violence of the IED, the sophistication of the IED, was not
anticipated," Sorenson says.
Each time the Army thought it had a fix on how many reinforced Humvees and armor kits it
would need in Iraq, Sorenson says, another surge of attacks pushed the number higher.
But official records and correspondence raise questions about whether the Army acted
aggressively enough:
• In August 2003, the Army officially increased the number of reinforced Humvees it said it
needed for Iraq. Military officials in Iraq increased the requirement for factory-built armored
Humvees twice that month, first to 1,233 and then to 1,407 in late August, according to a
February 2004 Pentagon "information paper" and other documents.
Sorenson says the initial attacks on unarmored Humvees could have been "random" events. When
attacks multiplied in the summer of 2003, senior officials asked field commanders whether they
needed more armored vehicles, and the commanders at first "said they did not want them,"
Sorenson says.
• In October 2003, the Army began moving reinforced Humvees to Iraq from U.S. bases around
the world, where it had more than 3,000 of the armored vehicles. In response to written
questions, the Army said it took time to locate the strengthened Humvees elsewhere in the world,
determine what their missions were, and make decisions about whether they could be shipped to
Iraq.
"Before such vehicles could be moved, the units had to be given other vehicles to perform their
missions," the Army wrote. "Shipping the vehicles after they were identified also took a certain
length of time, even with everyone's best efforts."
The Army says maintenance and transit alone took about two months. Even so, the process that
began in October 2003 was not complete until March 2004.
• In November 2003, the Army officially declared a need for more add-on armor kits to modify
Humvees already in Iraq. The armor plates could be bolted or welded onto existing vehicles,
adding protection while forces waited for the delivery of more factory-built armored Humvees.
The Army tripled the number of factories from which it was buying the kits, from seven to 21,
and the first shipments of kits began arriving the next month.
• By February 2004, the Army knew that Armor Holdings, the lone U.S. company that built
reinforced Humvees, could increase production to at least 450 a month, according to a memo
prepared for Strickland after a congressional briefing by a Pentagon official.
But for months, the Army did not take advantage of that production capacity. Rather than asking
the company to increase monthly production to 450 as soon as possible, the Army stuck to the
contract that did not call for that level of production until November 2004.
Only after Spc. Wilson questioned Rumsfeld in Kuwait last December did the Army redo the
contract to push monthly production to 550. Sorenson says the Army had trouble paying for
increased Humvee production, and in the congressional briefing, a Pentagon official cited "funding
problems" for not pressing for more production sooner, according to the memo prepared for
Strickland.
Members of Congress, including Strickland, say that's not a valid excuse. Had the Army asked,
Strickland says, Congress would have provided the money.
"If at any time the Pentagon had said to the Congress, to any of us, 'We need more money for
protective equipment for our troops,' they would have gotten it that day, I could guarantee you
that," Strickland says.
Able to make more
The Army first asked Armor Holdings officials in the fall of 2003 whether it would be possible
to increase production of the armored Humvees, according to Robert Mecredy, president of the
company's aerospace and defense group. A subsidiary, O'Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt of Fairfield,
Ohio, is the sole U.S. company building specially armored Humvees.
"We said, 'Yes, it would take up to six months, depending on steel, the hiring of people' " and
other items, Mecredy says. "From the fall of 2003 we said, 'Yes, we can ramp it up.' "
Mecredy says the company had, and continues to have, a good working relationship with "my
premier customer, the Army." But he says when no request to increase production was made, he
invited Les Brownlee, then the acting secretary of the Army, to the Ohio plant where armored
Humvees were made to push the issue in February 2004.
During his tour of the plant, Brownlee promised workers a "plan for getting these vehicles into
the hands of our troops just as fast as we can." But the Army did not change its contract to
increase Humvee production, according to Mecredy and Strickland. Mecredy says the Army
never said why.
Members of Congress also say the Pentagon didn't move quickly to ramp up production. "People
in the Pentagon were aware these vehicles could be produced in larger numbers," says Sen. Evan
Bayh, D-Ind., but "they have consistently underestimated the need for this kind of protection for
our troops. ... Unfortunately, soldiers have been killed because of that."
House Armed Services Chairman Hunter adds that Congress must "continue to push to provide
(the troops) the best equipment and gear to keep them safe so they can get the job done."
Sorenson insists the Army quickly rewrote contracts to build more armored Humvees. But even
efforts to add bolt-on armor to existing vehicles encountered delays. Testing was needed to
ensure that the extra 2 tons of armor didn't make the vehicles unwieldy and dangerous, Sorenson
says. In fact, the Army is looking at a recent spate of Humvee rollover accidents to see whether
bolt-on armor was a factor.
"When division commanders say they don't want the equipment, ... what are you going to (do)?"
Sorenson says. Had he been the father of someone killed in an unarmored Humvee, he says, "I
would be as outraged as anyone. I completely understand that, and there is really nothing I can
say to make them feel better."
The outcry over the lack of armored Humvees is loudest among troops' families. When soldiers or
Marines die in inadequately armored vehicles, friends and relatives ask why it's taking so long to
get better equipment to Iraq.
Army Pfc. John Hart and 1st Lt. David Bernstein of Phoenixville, Pa., were killed in their
unarmored Humvee on Oct. 18, 2003, in Taza, Iraq, when enemy forces ambushed their patrol
using rocket-propelled grenades and small-arms fire. According to Hart's father, they were killed
by the small-arms fire that penetrated the Humvee.
"My son called me the week before he was killed," says Brian Hart of Bedford, Mass. "He said
they were getting shot at all the time. They were in unarmored Humvees and were out there
exposed to fire. He was concerned they were going to get hit. He was literally whispering this
into the phone to me. He was right. That's how he died."
The following statement regarding this story was released May 5, 2005, by USA TODAY Editor
Kenneth Paulson: "An article written by USA TODAY staff writer Tom Squitieri and published
on March 28, 2005, included quotes taken from The Indianapolis Star that were not attributed to
the newspaper. Statements made by Sen. Evan Bayh, D-Ind., and Brian Hart, of Bedford, Mass.,
first appeared in a May 7, 2004, article on armored Humvees by Ted Evanoff of The
Indianapolis Star. USA TODAY and The Indianapolis Star are both Gannett newspapers.
Squitieri's actions violated USA TODAY's standards on sources and attribution. USA TODAY
apologizes to its readers. Squitieri has apologized and resigned."
A Marine stands in front of an armored Humvee hit by a roadside bomb in Ramadi, Iraq, in
November.
By Patrick Baz, AFP
By Tom Squitieri, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON — In June 2003, the U.S. Army realized that it didn't have enough armored
Humvees in Iraq to protect soldiers from a growing number of attacks by insurgents. By Friday,
officials expect to correct that problem by having almost 22,000 armored Humvees in Iraq — up
from 235 when the war began.
Why did it take the government almost two years to remedy a deficiency that the Army
acknowledges was costing soldiers' lives?
An examination of Army records, correspondence with members of Congress and Pentagon
documents shows that the military repeatedly underestimated the need for more armored
Humvees. Even after recognizing its miscalculations, the Army was slow to order more armored
Humvees, and then transported them to Iraq from its existing worldwide supply in fits and
starts. Officials also failed to take full advantage of a defense contracting firm that says it could
have increased production to meet the Army's needs.
The Defense Department had assumed that armored Humvees wouldn't be needed once the
invasion of Iraq was over. Original plans called for the Pentagon to pull back most tanks and
other armored vehicles to reduce the U.S. military profile as soon as Baghdad fell, because
strategists had projected that Iraq would quickly become peaceful. But violent attacks by
insurgents, never anticipated by the Pentagon, meant that troops traveling in unarmored Humvees
faced grave risks. (Related story: Electronic ears on alert for enemy gunshots)
The Pentagon says it does not keep figures on how many soldiers have died or suffered serious
wounds in unarmored Humvees. But at least 275 troops were killed in Humvees in 2003 and
2004 — one of every four American troops killed by hostile action during that period —
according to news accounts, Pentagon records and figures compiled by the staff of the members
of the House and Senate Armed Services committees.
It could not be determined whether those troops were in unarmored or armored Humvees, boxy-
looking trucks that replaced the Jeep as the military's all-purpose utility vehicle. Armored
Humvees, however, are reinforced to protect against the roadside bombs, rocket-propelled
grenades and automatic weapons used by insurgents. In the summer of 2003, most Humvees had
little armor, which made them much more vulnerable to attacks than the heavier Bradley Fighting
Vehicles and Abrams tanks.
The Pentagon "thought we would be pelted with rose petals and not RPGs (rocket-propelled
grenades)," says Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Calif., a member of the House Armed Services
Committee. "I don't blame them for getting it wrong. I blame them for not understanding and
adjusting fast enough, and the result is there has been a tremendous casualty list."
Better chance of survival
Armoring a Humvee is no guarantee of invincibility.
Insurgent bombs have destroyed heavily armored Humvees and even crippled 60-ton tanks. But
military personnel — from troops in the field to Gen. Richard Myers, the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff — say that soldiers have a better chance of surviving attacks in an armored vehicle.
Critics say the Pentagon was not quick enough to see the need, and then reacted too slowly.
"There was a reluctance on the part of the Pentagon to take it seriously and get as many of these
vehicles as quickly as possible," Rep. Ted Strickland, D-Ohio, says. "It was almost as if they
were in a defensive posture, that to make any changes or to acknowledge any shortcomings
would somehow be an acknowledgment that the planning had not been perfect."
In April 2004, Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee,
criticized the Army's efforts to get more armored vehicles or armor kits to Iraq, telling Army
officials they were afflicted by a "case of the slows."
Brig. Gen. Jeffrey Sorenson, the Army's deputy for acquisition and systems management,
disputes that charge. "To say that the Army has been unresponsive and been slow to respond is
an inaccurate statement," Sorenson says. "Everybody can be the Monday morning quarterback.
... We did not think there was a major insurgency. Commanders in the theater were not asking for
the vehicles. Who is to blame? I have no idea."
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has suggested the lack of armored Humvees was simply
beyond the Pentagon's control.
When Tennessee Army National Guard Spc. Thomas Wilson asked during a public session with
Rumsfeld in Kuwait last December why the Army didn't have enough reinforced Humvees,
Rumsfeld replied, "You go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might
want or wish to have at a later time."
By the time Rumsfeld said that, the Army had been working for almost a year and a half to
gradually increase the number of armored Humvees in Iraq. But Rumsfeld's encounter with
Wilson appears to have spurred the Pentagon: Two days later, on Dec. 10, the Army asked the
sole company producing factory-armored Humvees to boost its production by more than 20%.
Rumsfeld declined to comment for this story.
An unexpected weapon
The insurgents' weapon of choice for attacking Humvees is the IED, or "improvised explosive
device," a homemade bomb cobbled from whatever explosives are on hand — frequently, large
artillery shells. The Army acknowledges that the power and proliferation of the bombs came as a
surprise. "The extent and the violence of the IED, the sophistication of the IED, was not
anticipated," Sorenson says.
Each time the Army thought it had a fix on how many reinforced Humvees and armor kits it
would need in Iraq, Sorenson says, another surge of attacks pushed the number higher.
But official records and correspondence raise questions about whether the Army acted
aggressively enough:
• In August 2003, the Army officially increased the number of reinforced Humvees it said it
needed for Iraq. Military officials in Iraq increased the requirement for factory-built armored
Humvees twice that month, first to 1,233 and then to 1,407 in late August, according to a
February 2004 Pentagon "information paper" and other documents.
Sorenson says the initial attacks on unarmored Humvees could have been "random" events. When
attacks multiplied in the summer of 2003, senior officials asked field commanders whether they
needed more armored vehicles, and the commanders at first "said they did not want them,"
Sorenson says.
• In October 2003, the Army began moving reinforced Humvees to Iraq from U.S. bases around
the world, where it had more than 3,000 of the armored vehicles. In response to written
questions, the Army said it took time to locate the strengthened Humvees elsewhere in the world,
determine what their missions were, and make decisions about whether they could be shipped to
Iraq.
"Before such vehicles could be moved, the units had to be given other vehicles to perform their
missions," the Army wrote. "Shipping the vehicles after they were identified also took a certain
length of time, even with everyone's best efforts."
The Army says maintenance and transit alone took about two months. Even so, the process that
began in October 2003 was not complete until March 2004.
• In November 2003, the Army officially declared a need for more add-on armor kits to modify
Humvees already in Iraq. The armor plates could be bolted or welded onto existing vehicles,
adding protection while forces waited for the delivery of more factory-built armored Humvees.
The Army tripled the number of factories from which it was buying the kits, from seven to 21,
and the first shipments of kits began arriving the next month.
• By February 2004, the Army knew that Armor Holdings, the lone U.S. company that built
reinforced Humvees, could increase production to at least 450 a month, according to a memo
prepared for Strickland after a congressional briefing by a Pentagon official.
But for months, the Army did not take advantage of that production capacity. Rather than asking
the company to increase monthly production to 450 as soon as possible, the Army stuck to the
contract that did not call for that level of production until November 2004.
Only after Spc. Wilson questioned Rumsfeld in Kuwait last December did the Army redo the
contract to push monthly production to 550. Sorenson says the Army had trouble paying for
increased Humvee production, and in the congressional briefing, a Pentagon official cited "funding
problems" for not pressing for more production sooner, according to the memo prepared for
Strickland.
Members of Congress, including Strickland, say that's not a valid excuse. Had the Army asked,
Strickland says, Congress would have provided the money.
"If at any time the Pentagon had said to the Congress, to any of us, 'We need more money for
protective equipment for our troops,' they would have gotten it that day, I could guarantee you
that," Strickland says.
Able to make more
The Army first asked Armor Holdings officials in the fall of 2003 whether it would be possible
to increase production of the armored Humvees, according to Robert Mecredy, president of the
company's aerospace and defense group. A subsidiary, O'Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt of Fairfield,
Ohio, is the sole U.S. company building specially armored Humvees.
"We said, 'Yes, it would take up to six months, depending on steel, the hiring of people' " and
other items, Mecredy says. "From the fall of 2003 we said, 'Yes, we can ramp it up.' "
Mecredy says the company had, and continues to have, a good working relationship with "my
premier customer, the Army." But he says when no request to increase production was made, he
invited Les Brownlee, then the acting secretary of the Army, to the Ohio plant where armored
Humvees were made to push the issue in February 2004.
During his tour of the plant, Brownlee promised workers a "plan for getting these vehicles into
the hands of our troops just as fast as we can." But the Army did not change its contract to
increase Humvee production, according to Mecredy and Strickland. Mecredy says the Army
never said why.
Members of Congress also say the Pentagon didn't move quickly to ramp up production. "People
in the Pentagon were aware these vehicles could be produced in larger numbers," says Sen. Evan
Bayh, D-Ind., but "they have consistently underestimated the need for this kind of protection for
our troops. ... Unfortunately, soldiers have been killed because of that."
House Armed Services Chairman Hunter adds that Congress must "continue to push to provide
(the troops) the best equipment and gear to keep them safe so they can get the job done."
Sorenson insists the Army quickly rewrote contracts to build more armored Humvees. But even
efforts to add bolt-on armor to existing vehicles encountered delays. Testing was needed to
ensure that the extra 2 tons of armor didn't make the vehicles unwieldy and dangerous, Sorenson
says. In fact, the Army is looking at a recent spate of Humvee rollover accidents to see whether
bolt-on armor was a factor.
"When division commanders say they don't want the equipment, ... what are you going to (do)?"
Sorenson says. Had he been the father of someone killed in an unarmored Humvee, he says, "I
would be as outraged as anyone. I completely understand that, and there is really nothing I can
say to make them feel better."
The outcry over the lack of armored Humvees is loudest among troops' families. When soldiers or
Marines die in inadequately armored vehicles, friends and relatives ask why it's taking so long to
get better equipment to Iraq.
Army Pfc. John Hart and 1st Lt. David Bernstein of Phoenixville, Pa., were killed in their
unarmored Humvee on Oct. 18, 2003, in Taza, Iraq, when enemy forces ambushed their patrol
using rocket-propelled grenades and small-arms fire. According to Hart's father, they were killed
by the small-arms fire that penetrated the Humvee.
"My son called me the week before he was killed," says Brian Hart of Bedford, Mass. "He said
they were getting shot at all the time. They were in unarmored Humvees and were out there
exposed to fire. He was concerned they were going to get hit. He was literally whispering this
into the phone to me. He was right. That's how he died."
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